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From	the	moment	the	first	COVID-19	vaccines	are	rolled	out,	there	will	need	to	be	a	large	fraction	
of	the	global	population	ready	in	line.	It	is	therefore	crucial	to	start	managing	the	growing	global	
hesitancy	to	any	such	COVID-19	vaccine.	The	current	approach	of	trying	to	convince	the	"no"s	
cannot	work	quickly	enough,	nor	can	the	current	policy	of	trying	to	find,	remove	and/or	rebut	all	
the	individual	pieces	of	COVID	and	vaccine	misinformation.	Instead,	we	show	how	this	can	be	done	
in	a	simpler	way	by	moving	away	from	chasing	misinformation	content	and	focusing	instead	on	
managing	the	"yes--no--not-sure"	hesitancy	ecosystem.		Only	42	percent	of	Americans	in	the	September	YouGov	poll1	said	"yes"	to	receiving	a	future	COVID	vaccine,	down	from	May	across	all	political	sides.	That	means	that	even	in	a	best-case	scenario	where	a	future	high	performing	vaccine	is	80%	effective	in	an	individual,	it	would	only	impact	42x80=34%	of	the	population	which	is	way	below	predicted	thresholds	for	herd	immunity.	Worse,	current	narratives	within	online	social	media	communities	and	media	interviews2	suggest	that	many	of	these	"yes"	respondents	would	say	"no"	to	being	first	in	line.			
	
Fig.	1:	Hesitancy	ecosystem.	A:	Evolution	of	pro	(Blue),	anti	(Red)	and	"not	sure"	(Green)	vaccine	views	within	
communities	(nodes)	on	Facebook	during	COVID.	Methodology	and	layout	same	as	Ref.	6.	Each	node	is	a	Facebook	Page	
with	10-1,000,000+	members.	Black	circles	show	nodes	that	changed	color,	i.e.	changed	their	vaccine	view.	There	are	
currently	many	additional	nodes	which	are	Green	but	for	clarity	are	not	shown.	B:	Our	empirically	grounded	ecosystem	
model.	Each	subpopulation	comprises	nodes	of	a	given	color	from	A.	C:	The	model's	four	predicted	futures	depend	on	
the	policy	choice	being	made,	i.e.	they	depend	on	the	messaging	activity	coupling	values	(𝒈𝑩, 𝒈𝑹, 𝒓𝑩).	For	illustration,	the	
couplings	here	are	(𝟏. 𝟎, 𝟒. 𝟎, 𝟏. 𝟎),	(−𝟐. 𝟑, 𝟎. 𝟓, 𝟏. 𝟎), (−𝟐. 𝟎,−𝟎. 𝟓,−𝟏. 𝟎),	(−𝟎. 𝟓, 𝟎. 𝟓,−𝟐. 𝟓).	Each	type	of	outcome	is	an	exact	
solution	of	the	model	in	B	(see	Supporting	Online	Material	SOM)	and	is	robust	in	the	parameter	space.		
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	Such	a	high	level	of	hesitancy	risks	everyone's	health3,4,5	and	hopes	of	a	'return	to	normal'.	It	risks	the	diversity	of	volunteers	for	Phase	III	trials,	and	the	billions	of	dollars	allocated	to	vaccine	development.	It	risks	the	likelihood	of	people	accepting	future	COVID	booster	shots.	And	it	undermines	trust	in	existing	vaccines	for	other	diseases,	as	well	as	more	general	public	health	advice.		Trying	to	change	the	minds	of	hardcore	"no"s1	will	be	too	slow	and	too	hard.	Not	only	has	anti-vaccination	sentiment	been	around	since	vaccines	were	first	created,	our	study	of	the	social	media	ecosystem	shows	that	anti-vaccination	communities	actually	grew6	in	size	and	resilience	during	2019	--	despite	the	fact	that	measles	outbreaks	were	proliferating	throughout	2019	and	despite	the	fact	that	the	measles	vaccine	already	exists	and	has	a	strong	safety	record.	Worse,	their	opposition	to	a	future	COVID	vaccine	has	now	gone	into	overdrive	(Fig.	1A,	red	nodes).	They	won't	be	changing	their	minds	any	time	soon.		A	better	approach	is	to	focus	on	the	"not	sures":	and	we	don't	just	mean	the	31%	who	specifically	responded	"not	sure"	in	the	latest	poll1,	but	also	the	large	number	of	"yes"	respondents	who	say	they	will	delay	receiving	the	vaccine	until	others	have	had	it.	Our	analysis	of	the	online	Facebook	ecosystem	--	of	which	the	poll	appears	crudely	representative	--	reveals	well	in	excess	of	100	million	such	"concerned"	individuals.	Each	is	a	member	of	a	community	comprising	10-1,000,000	like-minded	fans	of	a	particular	topic	that	is	typically	unrelated	to	vaccines,	e.g.	pet	lovers,	parent	school	groups,	yoga	fans,	foodies	or	alternative	health	followers	(green	nodes,	Fig.	1A).	Since	members	of	the	same	community	tend	to	trust	each	other	on	this	one	topic	or	lifestyle	choice	(e.g.	pet	care,	best	choice	of	kindergarten,	wine	or	organic	blueberries),	they	also	tend	to	listen	when	their	community	starts	talking	or	posting	about	COVID	and	vaccines.	And	their	growing	collective	concern	has	led	their	community	to	form	links	with	anti-vaccination	communities	(red	nodes,	Fig.	1A).		But	how	to	reduce	the	hesitancy	of	these	"concerned"	communities?	
	
Misinformation	minefield	Given	the	vicious	circle	of	hesitancy	and	misinformation,	one	might	try	ramping	up	the	current	content-focused	policy	approach	of	labeling,	removing	or	debunking	specific	stories.	But	this	is	not	practical	given	the	escalating	number	and	nature	of	such	stories	and	the	need	to	act	now	before	vaccine	rollout.	It	may	also	backfire.	Take	the	often	cited	story	that	Bill	Gates	is	planning	to	put	semiconductor	markers	into	COVID	vaccines,	so	that	medical	records	can	be	scanned	from	our	families'	foreheads	at	school	or	work	like	a	can	of	supermarket	soup.	Both	elements	are	indeed	true:	semiconductor	quantum	dots7	can	be	excellent	biomarkers,	and	The	Gates	Foundation	has	been	involved	in	funding	related	research	as	well	as	COVID	vaccine	development.	So	while	there	is	zero	likelihood	this	story	will	play	out,	it	is	in	principle	possible	scientifically.	So	classifying	it	as	'misinformation'	and	removing	it	could	spark	claims	of	stifling	free	speech,	while	saying	it	is	'wrong	science'	amplifies	the	debate	of	what	is	'right	science'.	Both	fuel	the	misinformation	fire	and	both	are	now	rampant	within	the	"concerned"	communities	(green	nodes).		Worse,	Facebook	itself	cannot	find	all	misinformation	within	its	own	platform.	Leaving	pieces	untouched	can	wrongly	suggest	to	users	that	they	are	true.	Moreover,	misinformation	also	flows	freely	within	and	between	other	platforms	such	as	4Chan	which	are	beyond	Facebook's	control8.	So	to	do	all	this	well,	public	health	agencies	and	vaccine	manufacturers	would	have	to	become	more	expert	in	social	media	than	Facebook	--	which	is	again	impossible.		Then	come	the	content	flavors.	The	entire	establishment	health	enterprise	("Blue",	Fig.	1B)	can	do	little	more	than	put	out	statements	that	are	scientifically	correct,	which	means	almost	by	definition	that	they	are	quite	standard	and	plain:	vanilla.	By	contrast,	the	anti-establishment	health	subpopulation	("Red",	Fig.	1B)	collectively	offers	the	concerned-and-engaged	subpopulation	("Green",	Fig.	1B)	all	sorts	of	tempting	flavors	of	narrative.	These	range	from	the	lack	of	any	long-term	safety	record	for	a	COVID	vaccine,	which	
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is	of	course	technically	true;	to	claims	that	the	human	immune	system	offers	a	superior	form	of	resistance,	which	is	also	hard	to	disprove	given	the	lack	of	understanding	COVID	biology;	to	claims	of	hidden	agendas	of	governments	and	big	pharma,	which	again	is	hard	to	disprove	given	the	highly	political	nature	of	the	COVID	vaccine	race	and	the	billions	being	invested	to	secure	future	batches;	to	the	fact	that	science	is	still	struggling	to	give	precise	answers	to	seemingly	straightforward	(but	actually	highly	complex)	questions	such	as	best-choices	for	school	opening	hours,	numbers	in	a	class,	and	mask	design.			Blue	cannot	hope	to	win	such	a	content-chasing	war	quickly	enough	for	vaccine	rollout.	It	would	get	bogged	down	in	virtual	whack-a-mole	across	the	ever-expanding	multiverse	of	interconnected	social	media	platforms,	with	an	ever-expanding	set	of	stories	to	tackle	as	different	vaccine	candidates	from	different	countries	come	online	and	different	political	decisions	loom.		
More	when	and	less	what	Here	we	suggest	a	more	immediate	and	less	resource-intensive	approach	that	leverages	what	pro-establishment	messaging	(Blue)	already	has	at	its	disposal,	i.e.	when	to	engage	in	messaging	and	at	what	level	in	terms	of	volume.	Red	and	Green	feed	off	of	Blue's	activity,	and	Green	also	feeds	off	of	Red	(Fig.	1B).	Figure	1C	shows	how	powerful	the	approach	of	managing	the	ecosystem	could	be	using	a	simple,	undergraduate	level	model	(Fig.	1B)	that	combines	Newman's	gossip	model9	and	Strogatz's	relationship	dynamics	model10,	and	which	is	backed	up	by	empirical	findings	and	theory	from	studies	of	online	opinion	formation11	and	conflicts12	as	well	as	Ref.	6.	There	are	very	few	parameters	(Fig.	1B)	and	each	is	physically	meaningful.	Most	importantly,	this	simple	model	reproduces	the	main	features	of	the	evolution	of	the	Reds,	Blues	and	Greens	from	the	start	of	COVID	until	now	(see	SOM).			The	advantages	of	this	type	of	ecosystem	analysis	for	policymakers	are	that	the	predictions	are	available	as	precise,	plug-and-play	formulae	(see	SOM)	that	can	be	evaluated	by	hand	or	using	a	simple	calculator	app	on	a	phone.	No	computer	simulations	or	coding	required.	Interestingly,	it	predicts	4	distinct	classes	of	outcomes	and	hence	4	classes	of	policy	(Fig.	1C),	each	of	which	could	be	implemented	immediately	as	discussed	below.			
Policy	predictions	As	with	any	other	issue	such	as	climate	change,	framing	policy	discussions	in	terms	of	calculated	behaviors	with	quantifiable	and	testable	predictions,	is	far	more	powerful	than	vaguer	verbal	arguments	about	what	might	work.	Immediate	action	is	essential:	if	left	to	carry	on	as	is,	Fig.	1A	predicts	Red's	stronghold	will	not	only	continue	growing,	it	will	draw	in	and	likely	tip	an	increasing	fraction	of	Greens	which	will	seriously	undermine	all	future	COVID	vaccine	rollouts	and	renewals.		Policies	1-4	show	the	trade-offs	for	Blue:	on	the	one	hand,	Blue	must	get	communities	such	as	pet	lovers	and	yoga	fans	away	from	concern	about	COVID	and	vaccines,	and	back	to	back	to	their	real	interests,	i.e.	reduce	the	green	curve	in	Fig.	1C.	At	the	same	time,	it	must	keep	the	red	curve	under	control	(Red).	And	it	must	do	all	this	using	the	blunt	instrument	of	its	own	messaging	activity	and	without	feeding	the	infodemic	frenzy,	i.e.	Blue's	average	output	must	remain	steady	(blue	curve).	
	
Policy	1	shows	what	happens	if	Blue	mirrors	Red	and	Green's	messaging	activity,	in	the	scenario	that	Red	and	Green	are	also	doing	the	same	to	each	other,	i.e.	the	couplings	in	Fig.	1B	are	all	positive	(𝑔! , 𝑔" , 𝑟! >0).	This	is	like	becoming	louder	when	the	other	is	loud,	and	quieter	when	the	other	is	quiet.	The	"concerned"s	green	curve	initially	increases	and	hence	gets	worse,	but	then	settles	to	a	stable	value.	Red	activity	drops	to	a	lower	steady	value.	While	not	a	dramatic	improvement	in	overall	hesitancy,	it	is	in	principle	possible	to	choose	the	positive	coupling	values	such	that	total	support	is	above	the	estimated	herd	immunity	threshold.	Policymakers	would	however	have	to	warn	the	public	that	things	will	initially	feel	slightly	worse	before	improving.		
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Policy	2	differs	from	Policy	1	in	that	it	shows	what	happens	if	Blue	has	high	messaging	activity	levels	when	Green	is	low	and	vice	versa	(𝑔! < 0).	This	is	like	becoming	louder	when	the	other	is	quiet,	and	quieter	when	the	other	is	loud.	Though	Red	activity	drops	which	is	desirable,	Green	escalates	dramatically	which	is	undesirable.	
	
Policy	3	is	the	opposite	of	Policy	1	in	that	Blue,	Red	and	Green	all	have	negative	feedback	(𝑔! , 𝑔" , 𝑟! < 0).	So	they	become	louder	when	the	others	are	quiet	and	vice	versa.	The	outcome	is	good	all	round:	not	only	does	Red	activity	drop	to	a	steady	state,	Green	drops	dramatically	and	keeps	decreasing	over	time.		
	
Policy	4	differs	from	Policy	3	in	that	Red	and	Green	now	have	positive	feedback	(𝑔" > 0),	so	Red	and	Green	become	louder	when	the	other	is	loud,	and	quieter	when	the	other	is	quiet.	This	policy	has	the	advantage	over	Policy	3	in	that	both	Red	and	Green	eventually	both	keep	decreasing	over	time.	However	Green	initially	gets	worse,	before	then	showing	a	turning	point	which	can	be	calculated	and	hence	predicted	exactly.		Which	of	these	4	policies	is	most	suitable	will	depend	on	the	current	value	of	the	couplings	in	Fig.	1B.	But	the	key	is	that	they	can	each	be	analyzed	and	compared	ahead	of	implementation	on	a	case-by-case	basis	depending	on	Blue's	level	of	control	of	the	various	parameters	in	Fig.	1B,	using	the	plug-and-play	formulae	in	the	SOM.	Hence	the	system	can	be	nudged	toward	the	estimates	required	for	herd	immunity.			
Beyond	vaccines	These	policies	also	apply	to	other	situations	where	there	is	competition	between	establishment	messaging	(Blue),	anti-establishment	messaging	(Red)	and	a	background	population	(Green)	whose	'hearts	and	minds'	can	tip	the	balance13,14.	For	example,	it	could	help	with	the	contentious	climate-change	narratives	that	are	circulating	concerning	the	September	2020	wildfires	in	California	--	and	it	could	kick-start	the	needed	public	engagement	before	quantum	information	technologies	are	unleashed15.	Also	the	analysis	doesn't	just	apply	to	hesitancy	online.	Working	with	epidemiologists,	more	detail	can	be	added	to	Fig.	1B	by	incorporating	details	of	how	communities	are	interconnected	within	each	subpopulation	and	how	the	messaging	spreads,	hence	yielding	a	fuller	theory	of	infodemic	spreading	within	a	heterogeneous	population16,17.	Moreover,	the	role	of	specific	content	could	be	included	using	machine	learning18,	with	different	types	of	misinformation	having	different	coupling	values	in	Fig.	1B,	while	cleverer	use	of	human	psychology	could	enhance	the	model's	realism19,20,21.			
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Supporting	Online	Material	(SOM)				1.		Overview	of	the	equations	used	for	the	example	outputs	in	Fig.	1C	
	To	predict	policy	impacts	(Fig.	1C)	we	then	simply	run	the	model	forward	using	realistic	parameters	for	the	current	instant	in	time.	For	simplicity	here,	let's	suppose	that	Blue	will	continue	to	put	out	scientific	messaging	and	advice	as	the	COVID	vaccine	research	develops.	This	output	does	not	depend	on	the	gossip	going	on	within	Red	and	Green,	hence	the	direction	of	the	arrow	and	coupling	in	the	model.	Green	absorbs	this	(see	SI)	and	to	some	extent	so	does	Red,	but	Red	also	has	its	own	activity	toward	Blue	and	Green.	So	the	couplings	𝑔!	and	𝑟"	(Fig.	1B)	are	largely	in	Red's	control,	not	in	Blue's.	Hence	Fig.	1C	focuses	on	Blue	only	being	able	to	control	its	activity	level	with	respect	to	Green,	𝑔" ,	and	then	only	in	some	limited	way.	A	positive	coupling	between	two	populations	means	they	will	tend	to	synchronize	their	activity,	while	negative	means	they	will	tend	to	become	out	of	sync.						2.	Proof	that	the	model	reproduces	the	features	in	the	empirical	data	during	2020,	despite	have	very	few	parameters.			Shown	here	is	the	actual	data	(left	panels)	and	model	predictions	(right	panels)	for	the	number	of	communities	(i.e.	clusters,	each	of	which	is	a	node	in	Fig.	1A)	for	(top)	the	number	of	clusters	that	are	subscribers	to	other	clusters	that	are	broadcasting	COVID	narratives	and	hence	'listening	to	COVID	narratives',	and	(bottom)	the	number	of	clusters	that	are	broadcasting	COVID	narratives	to	other	clusters	and	hence	'talking	COVID	narratives'.				
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					3.		More	details	about	the	predicted	policy	result	in	Fig.	1C			
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 4.		The	exact	formulae	that	produce	the	predicted	policy	results	in	Fig.	1C		
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